Tibet vs. the PRC: Recapturing the Chinese 'Colonization' of Tibet

In 1951, arguably during the height of the decolonization movement Communist China infringed on Tibet’s sovereignty and has to this day not ceased its occupation of the Buddhist Himalayan mountain state. Whilst, Tibetans in 1959 (and again in 2008) revolted against the alien rule of the People’s Republic of China, their revolt was silenced with bloodshed. The military intervention of the People’s Liberation army cost the lives of tens of thousands of Tibetans. During these 60 years, hundreds of other colonies around the world have gained independence. Meanwhile, Tibetans are still futilely protesting their alien rule as the world averts its gaze. Today, Tibet is neither represented on world maps, nor on the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, whose aim it is to keep track of modern colonies. Even the Dalai Lama himself has stopped asserting Tibetan independence but commenced advocating for a middle way approach that merely asks for Tibetan autonomy within the People’s Republic of China. More surprisingly, the colonialist nature of China’s occupation remains at the side-lines of discourse on Tibet.

This paper seeks to trace how the Chinese occupation of Tibet escaped classic frameworks of colonialism. For this endeavour, it first lays out a case for the inadequacy of classic conceptions of colonialism in the Tibetan case, by contrasting the former’s essential requirements to an analytical framework of resemblances. After, it chronologically posits three developments that rendered the Chinese colonial empire invisible under such classic conceptions of colonialism.

Tibetan colonialism evaluated through essential requirements.

It is true, that when looking for essential features of colonialism, one cannot but notice their absence in the case of the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Classic definitions of colonialism point to necessary requirements such as alien rulers and the subjugation of native populations by means of racial hierarchies. Commonly these efforts were undertaken to enrich the colonizing elites by systematically exploiting a colony’s labour power and depleting its resources.

However, some argue against the purported Chinese colonialization of Tibet, that these crucial forms of relationships are missing, and henceforth Tibet has not been colonized. Ordinarily, a wide array of arguments is deployed when negating the narrative of Chinese colonialism of Tibet. One may point to the fact that despite Tibet’s wealth of mineral resources the Chinese have introduced only few industrial enterprises to the region. Moreover, in contrast to European colonial enterprises such as Rhodesian mines or Congolese plantations, it is a rarity for Tibetans to work for non-Tibetans. Contrasting such colonial narratives is also the fact that the PRC[1]’s subsidies for the Tibetan Autonomous region have produced new Tibetan middle and working classes, income growth, and improved education to name but a few benefits (Sautman, 2006, pp. 253). Likewise, a large affirmative action effort of preferential policies for ethnic minorities has been undertaken to lessen the socio-economic gaps between Han Chinese and Tibetans. These encompass exemptions from the Chinese family planning policies, preferential admissions in schools, exemptions from some taxes, and more (Hansen, 2007, pp. 111). These benefits are so substantial that Han Chinese prefer to register their children as from Tibetan origin when possible (Hansen, 2007, p. 114). The claim that the issue is an alien occupation is opposed by the fact that, while the two countries have distinct languages, customs, and religions, they have historically belonged to the same empire (Sautman, 2006, p. 247). Even the spiritual and political leader of pre-occupation Tibet, the Dalai Lama, claimed that Tibetan culture is a part of Chinese culture and tradition, thereby affirming that Tibetans are also Chinese (Brahm, 2005). Indeed, when evaluating the presence of essential characteristics of colonialism, one may be inclined to reject a colonial narrative for the China-Tibet dispute.

Still, this is only the case for those who try to evaluate the issue under a static conception of colonialism, wherein colonialism is a specifically European phenomenon to be assessed according to its essential characteristics. This normalized mode of thinking is, however, euro-centric and ignores all contemporary forms of colonialism. In contrast, by opening one’s analytical framework to other forms of imperial and colonial formations, not based on essential qualities but on family resemblances, the Chinese colonization of Tibet is rendered visible (McGranahan, 2007, p. 174).

Chinese Colonialism evaluated through resemblances.

 It is, for instance, when one considers whether the concept of colonialism applies by virtue of a ‘family resemblance’ – meaning that not all characteristics have to be instantiated and that other characteristics may be added or subtracted depending on historical or cultural context – that the Chinese colonialism of Tibet becomes visible. Upon closer examination within such a framework, other factors become discernible. For example, the fact that Han Chinese’s positive attitudes towards Tibetans derive from their allegiance to a civilizing mission similar to that of European colonial powers but adapted to a Chinese framework. The most conspicuous illustration thereof may well be, Han Chinese’s descriptions of Tibetans. Here, the ‘uncivilized’ backwardness familiar from a European colonial context, is conceived of in terms of the capability of the Tibetans to modernize, develop, and open up to outside influence (Hansen, 2007, p. 208). Generally, Han Chinese posit that Tibetans simply ‘[do] not have the brains’ (Hansen, 2007, p. 220) to work jobs and occupy positions such as their own. Yet, in contrast to western colonialism, the Han believe this can be remedied when the Tibetans sustain long-term contact with the Han, who assume the position of ‘teacher’s’. In fact, this belief provides the grounds on which they justify their alien presence in Tibet. The Han ‘s mission, they maintain, is to elevate the Tibetans to a higher atheist stage of development through modernization (Hansen, 2007, p. 243). This notion becomes even more precarious if one considers the fact that Chinese ‘development’ may oppose Tibetan ‘development’. Whereas for the Chinese the concept stands for industrialization and modernization, for the deeply religious Tibetans it would mean more monasteries and increased practice of their religious culture and values (Mukherjee, 2015, p. 76). In turn, the Chinese development of Tibet, which may negate a classic accusation of colonialism, under an extended analytical framework of resemblances becomes a denial of Tibetan self-expression and consequently a paragon of alien subjugation.

Whilst, such analytical extensions have certainly taken place in the academic sphere, the charge of colonialism against the People’s Republic of China from international and Chinese national political perspectives remains ambiguous. In fact, from an international outlook the debate on Tibet’s political status and sovereignty has long been displaced by those of ecology and human rights. Whereas, from the Chinese national angle, the matter seems settled and closed (McGranahan, 2007, p. 179).

Having compared these two conceptions, the essay traces how Chinas act of colonization has evaded capture within the aforementioned classic paradigm of colonialism both internationally and within China. In other words, why in the political sphere Chinese colonialism has not been associated with its European counterpart. Subsequently, two processes and one moment are depicted that significantly contributed to this development.

The moment of decolonization.

The relationship between China and Tibet before the Chinese appropriation was professed to be a form of suzerainty – a political constellation wherein a region has internal autonomy, but another region conducts its foreign relations. However, when British imperialist forces in 1903 wanted to open trade routes with Tibet, China floundered to summon any high ranking lamas to start such negotiations, hence, the British accurately concluded that whilst China may have connections to the Tibetan ruling class and formal suzerainty, it was without any substantial power in Tibet (Powers, 2004, p. 80). However, neither did the high lamas possess the capability to administrate all of Tibet. In fact, operating within a modern nation-state paradigm the relationship between the countries cannot be grasped. For their borders were porous and continually shifting. The truth is, that whilst both governments exercised authority in their respective provinces their power declined as one moved towards the peripheries. Yet, these peripheries were not contiguous but usually overlapping and their inhabitants conceived of themselves as independent from both governments (Powers, 2004, p. 158).

By 1904 the British had run out of patience, and their forces invaded Tibet to coerce the Dalai Lama to open trade relations. The Chinese, in turn, understood this as an infringement on their suzerainty by western colonial powers, which added to the familiar pattern of Chinese humiliation by imperialist foreign powers as the British took Hong Kong, the Japanese Shandong, and the U.S.-supported Kuomintang Taiwan. Consequently, by 1949, when Mao Zedong proclaimed the inception of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese conception of Tibet had transformed from a mere buffer state to a central piece in Communist China’s agenda of restoring a once mighty motherland.

After World War II, anti-imperialist discourse rose to prominence and around the world, as many nations cast off their colonial chains, one could venture to say that denouncing colonialism and imperialism had become en vogue. It was precisely this ‘moment of decolonization’ that would provide the cover for China’s invasion of Tibet. In this constellation, the PRC was uniquely positioned, for it had since long proclaimed its anti-imperialistic ideology in the form of the Chinese Communist Party. By the time of China’s takeover of Tibet, both Britain and the U.S. hesitated to intervene, for fear that the PRC would accuse them of trying to once again imperially dominate a rising China. Additionally, it was hard for these countries to claim they are coming to defend a sovereign country, as the nature of the Sino-Tibetan relationship and Tibet’s political status were ambiguous at the time. Advantageously, China’s anti-imperialist discourse too was responsible for the country to not be included in the category of contemporary empires by other nations and equally served to deflect such accusations from its own countrymen (McGranahan, 2007, p. 180-186). Additionally, the PRC justified its imperialism by casting Tibet as a cruel and medieval serfdom characterized by repressive policies of the religious class. Ironically, whilst the Chinese takeover was hard to denounce within the contemporary political climate it, in fact, reified the former loose concept of Tibetan nationality and borders (Powers, 2004, p. 73).

Owing to this particular historical constellation, hidden behind the cloak of anti-imperialism and shielded by a vague claim of suzerainty, the People’s Republic of China annexed Tibet unopposed.

Constructing a Chinese narrative.

Since the Tibetan government – inexperienced with the complexities of asserting oneself as a modern nation-state – up until the Chinese takeover of 1950 hadn’t constructed a historical case for its independence, it found itself with little grounds to contest Chinese rule and the question of its political status fell dormant for the next decade (Sperling, 2004, p. 17). Consequently, China was content with only putting forward a vague claim for its sovereignty over Tibet, asserting that the former had become an integral part of China already during the period of the Mongol empire, and has remained as such ever since (Sperling, 2004, pp. 7). Instead, it focused its efforts on naturalizing the new order and moulding the Tibetan into the Chinese national identity, since the communists believed that a strong nation was only feasible with a homogenous citizenry. This they attempted through bizarre twists of logic, such as an attempt to revise the term ‘Han’ in a way that it could be applied to Tibetans or interpreting the lack of a word for ‘China’ in the Tibetan language as mere ignorance rather than constitutive fact of the relation between the two countries (Sperling, 2004, p. 34).

However, the Tibetan revolt of 1959 changed the negligent attitude of both countries towards their historical claims. The popular uprising in Lhasa demonstrated to the Chinese populace that Chinese rule may indeed not be welcome and the question of the political status of Tibet garnered widespread international attention (Sperling, 2004, p. 10). Furthermore, the subsequent flight of the Dalai Lama and his government into exile gave the possibility for the creation of a historical claim of Tibetan independence. In turn, this forced the hand of the Chinese government to detail their own historical claim, for if its citizens would start questioning the legitimacy of Tibet’s “liberation” it would not be long before they’d start questioning the PRC itself (Sperling, 2004, p. 9, 17). Subsequently, the PRC doubled down on its claim of historical continuity. Ironically, it chose to resurrect the use of the Golden Urn, a means of selecting the new incarnations of high lamas imposed upon the Tibetans by the imperial Qing dynasty (Sperling, p. 29-32). Additionally, it started producing a wealth of historical documents with annotations underscoring that the Chinese claim has persisted since the Yuan era and never ceded, often plenty with language trying to stifle any questioning by repeatedly employing phrases such as: ‘As is known to all, Tibet has, since the 13^th century been an inalienable part of China’s territory’ (Sperling, 2004, p. 4).

Owing to the PRC’s control of national media outlets it succeeded and to the present day there is no Chinese debate about the political status of Tibet, rather the assertion that it is an ‘integral part of China’ has deeply entrenched itself in the minds of the population. In effect, China had blinded itself. However, with a Tibetan government in exile outside of the reach of the PRC, after almost a decade the possibility of a historical counterclaim had arisen.

The allure of human rights.

Whereas the Tibet issue was indeed addressed during the 1960s, shortly after the US-China rapprochement the western discourse on the status of Tibet essentially fell dormant. In the 1980s the TGE[2] realized that foreign governments had no interests in raising the Tibet issue, for fear of antagonizing the PRC. In response, the TGE adapted its program. In a series of strategy meetings, it determined that its political efforts would be more effective, if rather than trying to attract support from political institutions on the grounds of common interests, it would engage in a public relations effort, with the goal of pressuring governments by acquiring the support of their constituents. In this regard, the rhetoric of human rights seemed to be the most impactful in the quest of creating awareness with western constituents through the media. Their choice to pursue this rhetoric had unforeseen ramifications. Originally, the focus on human rights was meant, to give way to other more important issues, such as that of sovereignty. At the outset, the plan worked as intended. Western governments began to criticize China on the basis of its human rights violations. Yet, afraid to completely antagonize the PRC, the same politicians would aim to assuage their criticisms by keeping quiet on the issue of Tibetan sovereignty. In effect, the human rights approach had given western governments a language that was so ambiguous that their constituents would perceive it as criticism of China, but still moderate enough to not anger the PRC. In due time, this led to a substitution of the discourse of Tibetans as a nationality with a claim to a sovereign nation to that of a merely violated community. Finally, the TGE became trapped in its own success, since human rights as a device for their cause became the foundation of their relevance and was consequently unable to change their platform to more complex political issues such as Tibetan independence (Barnett, 2001).

Conclusion

We are often told “Colonialism is dead.” Let us not be deceived or even soothed by that. I say to you, colonialism is not yet dead. I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises.

—President Achmed Sukarno, Bandung, 1955 (Chatterjee, 2005, p. 487)

Colonialism is not static; it adapts to contexts and constellations. Insofar, our analytical frameworks too must extend. In the case of Tibet, academics may not have exactly failed to interpret Chinese colonialism as such, but the Tibetan issue of colonialism remains largely unacknowledged in today’s political relations.

In the moment of decolonization, China escaped the charge of colonialism due to the ambiguous nature of its relationship with Tibet, and the missing historical case for Tibetan independence. Furthermore, the world was blinded by its pronounced anti-imperialism. Hence, it becomes apparent, that we cannot rely on borders or pronounced ideologies to detect colonialism, for since the 20^th-century colonialism has learned to go underground, to disguise itself. Tracing how China misconstrued history to justify its annexation of Tibet, and subsequently tried to naturalize Tibetan identities as Chinese in an effort to erase its misdeeds, implores us to question self-evident truths such as ‘As is known to all, Tibet has always been a part of China’ within our own nations. The lesson from the government in exiles human rights discourse must be, that the success of our reproaches of colonialism is itself subject to (international) power constellations and, thus, can be diverted. In a nutshell, the struggle against colonialism must be boundless and interminable, following suit with each of its new embodiments.

References

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[1] People’s Republic of China

[2] Tibetan Government in Exile